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I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of initial disclosures was first introduced in the United 
States in the late 1970s and 1980s as a way to address the concerns of the 
day with regard to the adversarial character of civil discovery. The broad-
ranging discovery that had been the hallmark of the new Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 1938 was now seen as undermining the higher purpose 
of achieving the promises of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Rule 1—the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”1 As Judge William W. Schwarzer concluded, looking back at the 
original intent of the framers of the Federal Rules, “that vision has become 
clouded and the framers’ purpose is largely unfulfilled.”2 Even in 1989, 
he concluded that discovery, “originally conceived as the servant of the 
litigants to assist them in reaching a just outcome, now tends to dominate 
the litigation and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens.”3 His 
proposal, as well as that of Judge Wayne D. Brazil,4 was to “examine the 
adversary process in the context of the contemporary litigation 
environment.”5 He poignantly noted that the process “must be viewed, not 
as a philosophical abstraction, but as a response to societal needs.”6 
These comments are even more apt today. The discovery process has 
only expanded in terms of breadth and cost. Lawyers often get sidetracked 
from the merits of the case as they strive to win each procedural battle for 
their client, whether the cost is proportional to the case or not. 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have continued at a 
consistent pace since the 1980s, with a focus on controlling the growing 
discovery machine through rules intended to ensure proportional 
discovery and increased judicial case management.7 Judge Brazil’s and 
Judge Schwarzer’s proposals, and their philosophical underpinnings, 
formed the basis for amendments in the early 1990s that included initial 
disclosures as a key discovery mechanism. 
Initial disclosures were incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure through the amendments that went into effect on December 1, 
1. See generally Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (1978); William W. Schwarzer, The Federal 
Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 715 (1989). 
2. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 703. 
3. Id.
4. Brazil, supra note 1, at 1348. 
5. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 705.
6. Id.
7. See generally Hon. Rebecca Love Kourlis & Brittany K.T. Kauffman, Rule Reform, Case
Management, and Culture Change: Making the Case for Real and Lasting Reform, 24 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 493, 494-99 (2015). 
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1993. The 1993 revisions “evoked more vigorous opposition than any rule 
revision ever promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States [at 
that time], save the single exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”8 
Much of that criticism was directed at the initial disclosure amendments. 
The adopted provisions provided for disclosure of documents “that are 
relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings.”9 
Then, as today, the initial disclosures pertained to the information then 
reasonably available to the party. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
(Advisory Committee) included an opt-out provision in the 1993 initial 
disclosure amendments that resulted in a patchwork of implementation 
around the country. 
The Advisory Committee formed a discovery subcommittee in the 
mid-1990s to consider further amendments. The Advisory Committee’s 
efforts were informed by empirical research that suggested that some form 
of mandatory disclosure was in place in a majority of the districts, that 
attorneys who had practiced disclosure were highly satisfied with it, and 
that the fear of satellite litigation with respect to disclosure was 
unfounded. Nevertheless, the main theme and goal of the resulting 2000 
amendments, which narrowed the scope of initial disclosures to those 
documents the disclosing party “may use to support its claims or 
defenses,”10 was restoring uniformity in discovery practice across the 
country. The chair of the Advisory Committee summed up the process as 
follows: 
The beginning was a strong disclosure rule that could be, and was, 
defeated by local option. The next step is a diluted disclosure rule that 
cannot be defeated by local option. Perhaps in several more years the 
time will come for a strong disclosure rule that cannot be defeated by 
local option.11 
Despite these early challenges, since 2000, there has been a growing 
movement in support of initial disclosures as a way to address the growing 
cost and delay of civil litigation—and, in particular, discovery. There has 
been a growing consensus that the current adversary process takes too 
long and costs too much—and with that growing consensus, a parallel 
commitment to reform. In terms of initial disclosures, the “diluted 
8. Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends, 
156 F.R.D. 295, 295 (Sept. 1994).  
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (1993).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
11. Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to the Hon. 
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 7 (May 18, 1998) 
[hereinafter Memorandum to the Hon. Alicemarie H. Stotler]. 
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disclosure rule” from 2000 remains in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Nevertheless, there are pilot projects and efforts at the state 
and federal level that suggest a renewed focus on and support for initial 
disclosures. In fact, while there remain challenges, the current landscape 
suggests that a strong disclosure rule may be a necessary reform—
particularly for certain case types—in order to ensure that the civil justice 
system meets the needs of a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” process in the 
future. While a system of broad and efficient initial disclosures at both the 
state and federal levels may well be the answer to the challenges that have 
plagued our system for at least 50 years, we are not quite there yet. The 
lessons of the 1993 and 2000 amendments illustrate that rule reforms 
alone cannot change a national legal culture. What is needed are 
intermediary steps—pilot projects, innovation and adoption at the state 
level, and a growing body of empirical data—to move our system in the 
direction of early mandatory disclosures followed by tailored discovery 
and an adversarial process focused on the merits of the case rather than 
“hiding the ball.” 
II. THE PAST: THE HISTORY OF INITIAL DISCLOSURES
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”12 
There is much to be learned about the future of discovery—and in 
particular the role of initial disclosures—by first looking back at the 
history of disclosures, including the original intent behind their 
introduction and successes and failures along the way. 
A. The Origins of Initial Disclosures 
In December 1974, Judge Marvin E. Frankel delivered the 31st 
Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture in New York.13 His theme was that 
the “adversary system rates truth too low among the values that 
institutions of justice are meant to serve.”14 
We proclaim to each other and to the world that the clash of adversaries 
is a powerful means for hammering out the truth. Sometimes, less 
guardedly, we say it is ‘best calculated to getting out all of the fact. . . .’ 
That the adversary technique is useful within limits none will doubt. 
12. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284 (Scribner’s 
1905). 
13. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1031 (1975). 
14. Id. at 1032. 
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That it is ‘best’ we should all doubt if we were able to be objective about 
the question. Despite our untested statements of self-congratulation, we 
know that others searching after facts—in history, geography, medicine, 
whatever—do not emulate our adversary system. We know that most 
countries of the world seek justice by different routes. What is much 
more to the point, we know that many of the rules and devices of 
adversary litigation as we conduct it are not geared for, but are often 
aptly suited to defeat, the development of the truth.15 
Judge Frankel, having argued that as a profession we are too committed 
to contentiousness as a goal itself and too little devoted to the truth, 
proposed modifying the adversary ideal and making truth the paramount 
objective. He suggested that one of the areas worthy of study was “our 
elaborate struggles over discovery.”16 
Shortly thereafter, in 1978, Judge Wayne D. Brazil responded to 
Judge Frankel’s “disturbing and fundamental questions about the 
adversary character of American litigation” with his own critique and 
proposals for change.17 Brazil eschewed the discovery reforms of the day, 
calling for something more significant: 
The adversary structure of the discovery machinery creates significant 
functional difficulties for, and imposes costly economic burdens on, our 
system of dispute resolution. Because these difficulties and burdens are 
an inevitable consequence of adversary relationships and competitive 
economic pressures, they cannot be removed by the kind of limited, 
nonstructural discovery reforms that have been made in the past and are 
once again under consideration. To come to terms with these problems 
will require an assault on their sources; effective reform consequently 
must include institutional changes that will curtail substantially the 
impact of adversary forces in the pretrial stage of litigation.18 
Importantly, Judge Brazil highlighted the tension, which continues today, 
between the traditional adversary model of litigation and the intent behind 
the modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judge William W. Schwarzer similarly called out the growing gap 
between the traditional adversarial ideal and the litigation process as set 
forth in the rules. 
15. Id. at 1036 (internal citations omitted).
16. Id. at 1054. 
17. Brazil, supra note 1, at 1296. While Judge Brazil was a professor at the time of his article, 
he went on to serve for 25 years as a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California. Id. 
18. Id. at 1296-97. 
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The manner in which litigation is conducted is frequently wholly at odds 
with the spirit and the purpose of the rules. This is not so much because 
of abuse or misconduct, which are troublesome but not pervasive. More 
often it is because lawyers training in and committed to a system 
governed by the adversary process are not conditioned to function 
effectively in the pretrial environment envisioned by the federal rules.19 
Their proposal for addressing this growing tension—a proposal that was 
embraced and put into reality by the Advisory Committee with the 1993 
amendments—was a rule that would require prompt disclosure of all 
material documents and information by both parties at the beginning of 
every action, followed by supplemental and more tailored discovery as 
needed. 
B. 1993 Amendments 
The major purpose of the 1993 initial disclosure amendments was to 
“accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case and to 
eliminate the paperwork involved in requesting such information.”20 The 
rule was based on the experience of district courts that had previously 
required disclosures through local rules, court-approved standard 
interrogatories, or standing orders. The Advisory Committee noted that 
where jurisdictions had mandatory disclosures, litigants saved both time 
and expense, particularly if they met and conferred about the disclosures 
before engaging in further discovery.21 
The proposed amendments were initially published in August 
1991.22 Hundreds of written comments were received and reviewed by the 
Advisory Committee, and public hearings were held in November 1991 
and February 1992. There were approximately 300 comments and 70 
witnesses at the hearings, which was a strong response at the time but 
nothing compared to the over 2,000 comments received during the most 
recent public comment period for the rule amendments that went into 
effect in 2015.23 In May 1992, the Advisory Committee unanimously 
recommended that the proposed amendments be adopted. The U.S. 
19. Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 705. 
20. Memorandum to the Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 64 (May 1, 1992) (draft Comm. Notes to Rule 26).  
21. Id. at 64-65. 
22. See Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the United States, 
Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991). 
23. See Terry Carter, The Latest Discovery Mission: Judges Set to Debate Changes That Would 
Make New Federal Rules Mandatory, 85-SEP A.B.A. J. 20 (1999). 
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Judicial Conference approved the amendments and forwarded them to the 
Supreme Court for consideration. 
The products liability defense group, along with others, petitioned 
the Supreme Court, asking it to refuse to promulgate Rule 26(a)(1).24 The 
Supreme Court did not publicly respond to the petition and did not hold a 
hearing on the issues. Nor did the Supreme Court block passage of the 
amendments. Nevertheless, the proposed initial disclosure scheme drew 
significant criticism from Justice Antonin Scalia, who issued a dissenting 
statement along with Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Scalia 
called the changes “radical” and “potentially disastrous and certainly 
premature.”25  Scalia argued the initial disclosure requirement was 
inconsistent with the adversarial model of litigation in the United States. 
Once they made it to Congress, the amendments faced additional 
lobbying efforts. The House of Representatives “gutted the disclosure 
requirement in the Civil Rules Amendments Act of 1993 (H.R. 2814)” 
and voted to veto the amendments, but the Senate took no action on the 
bill, and the amendments as drafted by the Advisory Committee went into 
effect on December 1, 1993.26 Following Congress’s non-veto of the 
amendments, the American Bar Association distributed a memo asserting 
“that while a skirmish was lost in Congress the battle itself still raged.”27 
“The veto war could be won on the federal district court level, the memo 
said, by lobbying each district court to employ the opt-out provisions of 
amended Rule 26.”28 
Despite this very public opposition, there was also support in favor 
of the proposals. For example, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) forcefully 
urged adoption.29 In addition, “[t]he group that studied the proposal 
longest and hardest was the large committee of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers, which almost unanimously approved Rule 26 in the form 
in which it was sent to the Court as a reasonably crafted measure.”30 
24. See Carrington, supra note 8, at 307.
25. See John C. Koski, Mandatory Disclosure: The New Rule That’s Meant to Simplify
Litigation Could Do Just the Opposite, 80-FEB A.B.A. J. 85, 86 (1994). 
26. See id. For more on the bills that were introduced in opposition to the amendments, and the 
last minute wrangling in the Senate, see Carrington, supra note 8, at 307.  
27. Eric K. Yamamoto & Joseph L. Dwight, IV, Procedural Politics and Federal Rule 26:
Opting-Out of “Mandatory” Disclosure, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 167, 199 (1994). 
28. Id.
29. See id. at 168. 
30. Carrington, supra note 8, at 308. Attachment B to the Memorandum to the Hon. Robert E. 
Keeton, Chairman, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 64 (May 1, 1992).  
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1. Purpose and Scope of the 1993 Amendments
In terms of scope, the 1993 initial disclosures provided that the 
parties, without awaiting a discovery request, must provide several 
categories of discovery. As to documents, the parties were required to 
initially disclose “a copy of, or a description by category and location of, 
all documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged 
with particularity in the pleadings.”31 The rule went on to provide: 
A party shall make its initial disclosures based on the information then 
reasonably available to it and is not excused from making its disclosures 
because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or because 
it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures or because 
another party has not made its disclosures.32 
Thus, as the Advisory Committee recognized in the Committee 
Notes to Rule 26, the requirement for disclosure of documents “applies to 
all potentially relevant items then known to the party, whether or not 
supportive of its contentions in the case.”33 
The Committee Notes explained further: 
The initial disclosure requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) are 
limited to identification of potential evidence “relevant to disputed facts 
alleged with particularity in the pleadings.” There is no need for a party 
to identify potential evidence with respect to allegations that are 
admitted. Broad, vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated 
in notice pleading—for example, the assertion that a product with many 
component parts is defective in some unspecified manner—should not 
impose upon responding parties the obligation at that point to search for 
and identify all persons possibly involved in, or all documents affecting, 
the design, manufacture, and assembly of the product. The greater the 
specificity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more 
complete should be the listing of potential witnesses and types of 
documentary evidence. 
. . . . 
The rule does not demand an exhaustive investigation at this stage of the 
case, but one that is reasonable under the circumstances, focusing on the 
facts that are alleged with particularity in the pleadings. The type of 
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
33. Summary of the Report to the Judicial Conf. Comm. on the Rules of Practice and Procedure 
App. E at 96 (Sept. 1992). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/7
2017] THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF DISCOVERY 791 
investigation that can be expected at this point will vary based upon such 
factors as the number and complexity of the issues; the location, nature, 
number, and availability of potentially relevant witnesses and 
documents; the extent of past working relationships between the 
attorney and the client, particularly in handling related or similar 
litigation; and of course how long the party has to conduct an 
investigation, either before or after the filing of the case. As provided in 
the last sentence of subdivision (a)(1), a party is not excused from the 
duty of disclosure merely because its investigation is incomplete. The 
party should make its initial disclosures based on the pleadings and the 
information then reasonably available to it. As its investigation 
continues and as the issues in the pleadings are clarified, it should 
supplement its disclosures as required by subdivision (e)(1). A party is 
not relieved from its obligation of disclosure merely because another 
party has not made its disclosures or has an inadequate disclosure.34 
2. The “Opt-Out” Provision and Adoption of the 1993
Amendments
A key feature of the 1993 initial disclosure amendments was the 
language that permitted each court by local rule or order to exempt all 
cases, or categories of cases, from some of the rules’ requirements.35 The 
rule also permitted the parties to stipulate out of some of the requirements. 
Thus, by order the court could eliminate the provisions or modify the 
disclosure requirements in a particular case. Likewise, unless precluded 
by order or local rule, the parties could stipulate to the elimination or 
modification of the requirements in their case.36 This authorization for 
local variation was included in large part because of the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), “which implicitly direct[ed] districts to 
experiment during the study period with differing procedures to reduce 
the time and expense of civil litigation.”37 The purpose of the CJRA was 
to create “laboratories for litigation reform in most federal districts, 
though they could opt out. The idea was for the bench, the bar, and the 
public to percolate ideas so that the best might be adopted systemwide.”38 
The result of this opt-out language was a patchwork of 
implementation of the 1993 initial disclosure amendments. As one 
commentator characterized it in 1994, “confusion and national dis-
34. Id. at 98-99 (internal citations omitted). 
35. Rule 26(a)(1) applied “[e]xcept to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or
local rule.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
36. Memorandum to the Hon. Robert E. Keeton, supra note 30, at 65.
37. Id. 
38. Carter, supra note 23, at 20. 
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uniformity mark the present state of Federal Rule 26 and mandatory 
disclosure.”39 
As a result of the inconsistency in the adoption of the 1993 initial 
disclosure provisions, the FJC compiled reports, starting on March 1, 
1994, and continuing thereafter, noting implementation of the disclosure 
provisions in the district courts around the country.40 As of 1997, there 
were 49 district courts where the rules were in effect (7 of which were in 
effect with significant revision), and 45 where the rules were not 
implemented (but 4 where initial disclosures were substantially provided 
for by CJRA provisions, 18 where a judge may order disclosure in specific 
cases, and 1 in effect for limited case types).41 
In addition, the FJC commissioned a nationwide study to look at the 
effects of mandatory disclosures on litigation and to see if the predictions 
had come true.42 The findings were generally positive: 
• For those who did report an effect, attorneys were more
likely to say initial disclosures decreased their client’s
overall litigation expenses, the time from filing to
disposition, the amount of discovery, and the number of
discovery disputes. They were also more likely to report that
initial disclosures increased overall procedural fairness,
fairness of outcome, and prospects for settlement.43
• Although mandatory disclosures did not eliminate the need
for additional discovery, the FJC’s study found areas where
discovery proceeded more efficiently as a result of the initial
disclosures: 43% reported the amount of discovery requests
decreased; 36% reported an increase in settlement
discussions, and only 6% reported a decrease; and 33%
reported a decrease in disputes related to discovery,
compared to 5% reporting an increase.44
• In general, attorneys’ views on the effectiveness of initial
disclosures did not differ between plaintiffs’ lawyers and
defendants’ lawyers. Likewise, there was not a significant
39. Yamamoto & Dwight, supra note 27, at 199.
40. See, e.g., Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United States District Courts,
With Specific Attention to Courts’ Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26 (Mar. 28, 1997) (the fourth report to be issued).  
41. Id. 
42. See Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, & John Shapard, An Empirical Study of
Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C.L. REV. 525 
(1998). 
43. Id. at 562. 
44. Id. at 563. 
10
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difference of opinion by type of case litigated or the 
importance of nonmonetary issues.45 
The RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted its own private study 
on the effects of mandatory disclosure. It conducted a docket analysis of 
5,000 cases filed before and after the rule, surveyed 2,000 attorneys, and 
reviewed the time sheets of attorneys in 1,000 cases.46 The study did not 
find evidence that the mandatory disclosures gave rise to the explosion of 
litigation that was predicted. 
• In general, the study found no statistically significant
difference in the lawyers’ hours in cases with disclosures
versus no disclosures. There was one exception: in
jurisdictions requiring “early mandatory disclosures of
information bearing on both sides of the dispute,” attorneys’
work hours were significantly lower.47
• No statistically significant change in time to disposition.48
• A system of mandatory disclosure corresponded to lower
attorney satisfaction, but for cases where attorneys reported
actual early disclosure of information, they reported
“significantly higher satisfaction than attorneys from other
cases.”49
Thus, despite the uproar at the time of adoption, the real issue post-
implementation was with the inconsistency in adoption of the initial 
disclosure provisions around the country. As a commentator on one side 
of the aisle remarked in 1994, one year after promulgation: 
Shrill claims that Rule 26 would abrogate the adversary system have 
begun to diminish in frequency and volume as lawyers have recognized 
that the obligation to disclose is not fundamentally different from the 
obligation to respond to interrogatories, and can actually serve to 
enhance the ability of advocates to play a useful role in the managerial 
judge’s task of scheduling discovery.50 
C. 2000 Amendments 
In 1996, the Advisory Committee undertook a review of the 1993 
amendments to determine whether additional changes should be made. 
45. Id.
46. See James S. Kakalik et al., DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA 48-51 (reprinted in 39 B.C.L. REV. 613) (1998). 
47. Id. at 48-49. 
48. Id. at 51. 
49. Id.
50. Carrington, supra note 8, at 309.
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The CJRA had ended by its own terms in 1997. Thus, a main theme and 
goal of the package of amendments that followed was restoring uniformity 
in discovery practice.51 In 2000, amendments were passed that revised the 
Rule 26 initial disclosure provisions. 
The authorization in Rule 26(a)(1) for local rules that opted out of 
the initial disclosure requirements was eliminated. In addition, the scope 
of the disclosure obligation was substantially reduced, applying to 
documents the disclosing party “may use to support its claims or 
defenses.”52 The Advisory Committee tied the scope to the exclusion 
provisions of Rule 37(c)(1), with the focus “on ensuring that anything a 
party may want to use in the proceeding will be promptly revealed to the 
other side.”53 The 2000 amendments further eliminated the reference to 
matters pleaded with particularity and exempted eight categories of 
proceedings from the disclosure requirements altogether. Finally, a party 
who does not believe disclosure is appropriate in the case can state the 
objection in the Rule 26(f) report to the court. The timing of disclosures 
was also altered in conjunction with the Rule 26(f) timing changes. 
Despite this narrowed scope, the language in the rule related to the 
reasonable availability of documents was not changed, providing that a 
party must make its initial disclosures “based on the information then 
reasonably available to it and is not excused from making its disclosures 
because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or because 
it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures or because 
another party has not made its disclosures.”54 
The comments from Judge Paul Niemeyer, then Chair of the 
Advisory Committee, illustrate the backdrop against which the 
amendments were made: “It’s been a very difficult political problem 
[among the district judges], and I’m trying to get some of their support. 
And I’m having a lot of difficulty.”55 Judge Niemeyer went on to explain 
further: 
Set against this course is the concern that local variations should not be 
endured any longer than necessary. Remembering the controversy that 
51. See generally Richard L. Marcus, The 2000 Amendments to the Discovery Rules, 2001 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 1 (2001). 
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
53. Marcus, supra note 51, at 11.
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (2000). This language remains substantially the same today. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(E) (“A party must make its initial disclosures based on the information then 
reasonably available to it. A party is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully 
investigated the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures or because 
another party has not made its disclosures.”). 
55. Carter, supra note 23, at 20. 
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swirled around Rule 26(a)(1)—and particularly remembering that it 
became effective only because Congress ran out of time to reject it—the 
Committee concluded that it is better to propose a less controversial rule 
for national uniformity. . . . Whatever the best long-term 
accommodation of these competing arguments may be, the better answer 
for the time being is clear. Initial disclosure remains highly 
controversial. The adversary system should not yet be qualified by 
disclosure to the extent of forcing the more sophisticated litigant to 
disclose even the mere identity of witnesses and documents that a less 
sophisticated litigant may not manage to uncover by discovery.56 
Thus, the main driver of the 2000 amendments was achieving 
national uniformity. While there were judges and some members of the 
bar that opposed eliminating the opt-out power, the vast majority of the 
organized bar and commenting attorneys and professors supported 
restoring uniformity.57 
III. THE PRESENT
Setting aside the fact that initial disclosures were significantly 
limited in their scope in 2000, the steady and growing momentum of civil 
justice reform—and in particular the focus on discovery reform—has 
continued. This effort has culminated in significant rule reforms at the 
federal level in December 2015,58 and a set of state court 
recommendations endorsed by the Conference of Chief Justices in July 
2016, which call for transformative reforms in our state courts.59 While 
the concept of broad initial disclosures has been put on hold in terms of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, initial disclosures have played an 
important role in the undercurrent of both state and federal reform. 
In 2007, IAALS—the Institute for the Advancement of the American 
Legal System at the University of Denver—and the American College of 
Trial Lawyers (ACTL) Task Force on Discovery engaged in a joint project 
to examine the role of discovery in the United States and to set forth a 
series of recommendations for reform.60 While the project originally 
56. Memorandum to the Hon. Alicemarie H. Stotler, supra note 11, at 7. 
57. See id. at 65.
58. Letter from Hon. John Roberts to Hon. John Boehner (Apr. 29, 2015) (transmitting
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as adopted by the Supreme Court).  
59. See CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE 
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES BY THE CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE (2017) 
[hereinafter CALL TO ACTION]. 
60. See Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys. & Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers Task
Force on Discovery and Civil Just., Final Report on the Joint Project of the American College of Trial 
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focused on discovery, the scope of the project expanded to look at the civil 
justice system, more broadly examining the cost and delay undermining 
the goals of a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution in every case. 
One of the key recommendations from the IAALS/ACTL Task Force’s 
2009 Final Report was that “[p]roportionality should be the most 
important principle applied to all discovery.”61 
The Final Report went on to urge a shift in the current approach to 
discovery. First, “[s]hortly after the commencement of litigation, each 
party should produce all reasonably available nonprivileged, non-work 
product documents and things that may be used to support that party’s 
claims, counterclaims or defenses.”62 After those initial disclosures, only 
limited additional discovery should be permitted.63 The Task Force 
recognized that this was a “radical proposal,” as well as their “most 
significant proposal.”64 But the goal was to challenge the current practice 
of “broad, open-ended and ever-expanding discovery” that has become a 
hallmark of modern civil discovery practice.65 The goal was to change the 
default from unlimited discovery, which has contributed to the cost and 
delay in our system, to a system of proportional discovery tied to the 
claims actually at issue. 
In 2010, the call for reform was taken up by the Advisory Committee, 
which hosted a Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke University Law 
School (Duke Conference) focused on evaluating the current state of civil 
litigation in the federal courts.66 The conference included over 200 
participants with diverse views and expertise, and extensive papers and 
empirical studies preceded the conference.67 The consensus from the 
conference was that the system did not need major restructuring, but that 
“the disposition of civil actions could be improved by advancing 
cooperation among parties, proportionality in the use of available 
procedures, and early judicial case management.”68 The initial disclosure 
Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal 
System, 268 F.R.D 407 (2009). 
61. Id. at 415. 
62. Id. at 416. 
63. Id. at 417. 
64. Id. 
65. Id.
66. Memorandum to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (June 14, 2014) (App. B to September 2014 Rules Submission). 
67. Id. at Rules App. B-2. 
68. Id. 
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obligations were a subject of discussion at the conference, with a variety 
of reactions but not a clear consensus on initial disclosures.69 
In 2015, IAALS and the ACTL Task Force—recognizing that 
significant reforms and empirical research had happened since the 2009 
Final Report—revised its original set of principles with the goal of 
furthering the dialogue and calling for further civil justice reform.70 One 
of the most significant changes from the 2009 Final Report to the 2015 
Report on Progress and Promise was the proposal to broaden initial 
disclosures to make them truly effective.71 The 2015 Report 
recommended that “[s]hortly after the commencement of litigation, each 
party should produce all known and reasonably available non-privileged, 
non-work-product documents and things that support or contradict 
specifically pleaded factual allegations.”72 Thus, the ACTL Task Force 
proposed to broaden the current federal initial disclosures in two ways: to 
require actual production rather than mere description of documents by 
categories and location, and to require production “of all known and 
reasonably available documents and things that support or contradict 
specifically pleaded factual allegations.”73 The goal of such a proposal is 
to “encourage the parties to bring the facts and issues to light at the earliest 
opportunity, thus allowing the litigation process to be shaped by the true 
nature of the dispute.”74 
69. Report to the Chief Justice of the United States on the 2010 Conf. on Civil Litigation
Submitted by the Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules and the Comm. on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure 9 (2010).  
A number of Conference participants argued that the result is a rule that is unnecessary for 
many cases, in which the parties already know much of the information and expect to do 
little or no discovery, and inappropriate or unhelpful for more heavily discovered cases, 
in which discovery will of necessity ask for identification of all witnesses and all docu-
ments. Some responded that a more robust disclosure obligation is the proper approach, 
pointing to the experience in the Arizona state courts. Others argued for entirely or largely 
abandoning the initial disclosure requirement.  
Id.  
70. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.  LEGAL SYS. & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS 
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE, REFORMING OUR CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A 
REPORT ON PROGRESS AND PROMISE (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter REPORT ON PROGRESS AND PROMISE]. 
71. Id. at 19. 
72. Id. The recommendation goes on to note that “[t]he parties should retain the right in
individual cases to make a showing to the court that this initial production may not be appropriate or 
may need to be modified.” 
73. Id. 
74. Id.
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A. Case-specific Disclosures 
At the 2010 Duke Conference, there was a wide range of attendees 
who supported the idea of case-type-specific “pattern discovery.”75 The 
goal of this type of discovery would be to set forth a set of articulated 
initial disclosure of information and documents that would be produced 
by each side for a specific case type.76 There was also a consensus that 
employment cases, which are “regularly litigated and that present 
recurring issues,” would be a good area for experimentation with the 
concept of case-type-specific disclosures.77 
Following the Duke Conference, and in response to the interest in 
case-specific disclosures, Judge Lee Rosenthal convened a nationwide 
committee of employment lawyers, facilitated by IAALS and led by Judge 
John Koeltl, to develop a set of disclosures that could be pilot-tested by 
federal judges around the country. The committee was comprised of a 
balanced group of highly experienced attorneys from across the country 
with expertise in employment law. The committee met in person on 
numerous occasions to develop the list of documents and information to 
be automatically disclosed to the other party. IAALS facilitated the 
meetings and the development of the protocols, with the ultimate goal of 
achieving a more efficient process for those cases alleging adverse 
employment actions. The Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment 
Cases Alleging Adverse Action (Employment Protocols) were published 
in November 2011, with the intent that they be implemented by individual 
United States District Court judges. The protocols “create a new category 
of information exchange, replacing initial disclosures with initial 
discovery specific to employment cases alleging adverse action.”78 The 
Employment Protocols list a specific set of documents and information 
that must be provided automatically by both sides within 30 days of the 
75. Memorandum to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 10 (May 17, 2010). 
76. Similarly, “pre-action protocols” have been developed in the United Kingdom for specific 
practice areas, detailing the conduct and steps expected of the parties prior to commencing 
proceedings, including the exchange of specific information. See, e.g., Practice Direction—Pre-
Conduct and Protocols (updated Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/rules/pd_pre-action_conduct#3.1 [https://perma.cc/PK7Q-YNPS]. Pre-Action Protocols 
are available for specific case types at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/protocol [https://perma.cc/TV5V-JVUW]. 
77. Pilot Project Regarding Initial Discovery Protocols for Employment Cases Alleging
Adverse Action, FED. JUD. CTR., at 1 (Nov. 2011), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/
files/documents/publications/federal_employment_protocols_pilot_project.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2UH-N7RJ].  
78. Id. at 2. 
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defendant’s responsive pleading or motion, and they supersede the 
parties’ obligations to make initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1). 
“The purpose of the pilot project is to encourage parties and their counsel 
to exchange the most relevant information and documents early in the 
case, to assist in framing the issues to be resolved and to plan for more 
efficient and targeted discovery.”79 
The Employment Protocols are currently being utilized by over 70 
individual federal district court judges around the country, including 
Arizona, California, Illinois Northern, New York Eastern, New York 
Southern, Ohio Northern, Pennsylvania Eastern, and Texas Southern.80 
Two jurisdictions, the District of Connecticut81 and the District of 
Oregon,82 have adopted the protocols district-wide. The FJC evaluated the 
pilot project in 2015 and found that the average number of discovery 
motions filed in the pilot cases was half the number filed in non-pilot 
cases. In addition, motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment 
were both less likely to be filed in pilot cases.83 This research is consistent 
with the experiences on the ground. Judge Lee Rosenthal and Judge John 
Koeltl have both received positive feedback from their colleagues who 
use the protocols, attributing this “to how easy it is to screen eligible cases 
and issue the order as well as the reduction in combat over document 
requests.”84 
Inspired by the success of the Employment Protocols, IAALS has 
facilitated the development of a second set of discovery protocols for Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) cases. As with the Employment Protocols, 
they were developed by a balanced group of attorneys who brought to the 
project their extensive experience regarding FLSA matters. IAALS once 
again facilitated the development of the protocols, along with the support 
of Judge Lee Rosenthal and Judge John Koeltl. The FLSA Protocols 
similarly include initial discovery specific to individual FLSA cases not 
filed as collective actions, to be exchanged early in the life of the case. 
79. Id. at 4. 
80. Emery G. Lee & Jason A. Cantone, FED. JUD. CTR., REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT 
REGARDING INITIAL DISCOVERY PROTOCOLS FOR EMPLOYMENT CASES ALLEGING ADVERSE 
ACTION 3 (2015) [hereinafter, Lee & Cantone, REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT]. See also Memorandum 
to Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules from Emery G. Lee & Jason A. Cantone, Pattern 
Discovery in Employment Cases Pilot Project (Oct. 26, 2016). 
81. See U.S. District Court District of Connecticut, Notice Regarding Initial Discovery
Protocols for Certain Employment Cases (2013), http://ctd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/
discoveryProtoc.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BV3-L39K].  
82. See D. Or. R. 26-7. 
83. Lee & Cantone, REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT, supra note 80, at 1. 
84. Laura McNabb, Pilot Project Reduces Delay and Cost in Federal Litigation, 41 LITIG. 3 
(Spring 2015). 
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Like the Employment Protocols, the FLSA Protocols were well received 
by the Advisory Committee and, with the Committee’s support, are being 
published by the FJC with the goal that judges will implement the 
protocols in individual cases nationwide.85 
B. Federal Pilot Projects 
The Advisory Committee has recently developed two pilot projects 
focused on reducing cost and delay—one focused on expedited 
procedures86 and the other on initial disclosures. In 2017, the Advisory 
Committee formally launched the Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot 
Project (MIDP). The MIDP project harkens back to the 1993 amendments, 
going beyond what the parties “may use” to require robust mandatory 
initial discovery of facts relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses, 
whether favorable or unfavorable. The project requires disclosure of this 
information without prompting by formal discovery requests. Judge 
David Campbell of Arizona, who led the subcommittee that developed the 
pilot project, noted “that the purpose of pilot projects is to advance 
improvements in civil litigation by testing proposals that, without 
successful implementation in actual practice, seem too adventuresome to 
adopt all at once in the national rules.”87 The project was drawn from the 
experiences of initial disclosure in the state courts and Canada, where the 
collective feedback was that “[p]eople who work under these disclosure 
systems like them better than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”88 
The District of Arizona was the first to participate in the three-year 
pilot project, launching the pilot, which became effective on May 1, 
2017.89 The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois has also implemented the pilot project, effective June 1, 2017.90 
The Advisory Committee hopes to get several more jurisdictions on 
board, with the goal of 100% participation—or at least the vast majority 
85. Initial Discovery Protocols for Fair Labor Standards Act Cases Not Pleaded As Collective 
Actions, FED. JUD. CTR. (Jan. 2018), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/12/
Initial_Discovery_Protocols_FLSA_Jan_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A27J-D2N9]. 
86. See Expedited Procedures Pilot Project: Overview, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/320247/expedited-procedures-pilot-project-overview 
[https://perma.cc/RD3F-XCB6]. 
87. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Agenda Book 73 (Nov. 3-4, 2016). 
88. Id.
89. General Order 17-08, In re: Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project in the District of
Arizona (as amended Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-
orders/17-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ4D-TGW6]. 
90. General Order 17-0005, (N. D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/
_documents/MIDP%20Standing%20Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB25-36WU]. 
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of the judges in the district participating—for purposes of evaluation and 
culture change.91 
The initial discovery is implemented through a standing order in each 
participating court, which makes participation mandatory, excepting out 
those cases exempt from initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1)(B)cases 
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PLSRA), patent cases 
governed by local rule, and multidistrict litigation cases.92 The Standing 
Order explains the parties’ obligations under the pilot project and sets 
forth the initial discovery requests to which the parties must respond. 
While the pilot project has the effect of early mandatory initial 
disclosures, the Standing Order implements the requests as a set of 
mandatory initial discovery requests from the court, addressed to all 
parties, with a requirement that parties respond similarly to discovery 
requests under Rules 33 and 34.93 
Under the MIDP, the parties are required to disclose both favorable 
and unfavorable information that is relevant to their claims and defenses, 
regardless of whether they intend to use the information. This is broader 
than, and supersedes, the current Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. 
Moreover, unlike the initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1), the parties 
are not able to opt out of the MIDP discovery. In addition, the parties must 
file a notice of service of their initial responses and later supplements to 
the court so that the court can monitor compliance. 
Recognizing the importance of how such a pilot is implemented, and 
the need for buy-in, the Advisory Committee developed a number of 
resources with the help of the FJC to support the successful 
implementation of the pilot projects. These resources included a User’s 
Manual, a checklist that itemizes the requirements under the MIDP for 
participating judges and attorneys, and a set of videos that introduce the 
pilots and speak to their purpose.94 
91. See Advisory Comm. On Civil Rules, Agenda Book, supra note 87, at 77-78. 
92. See, e.g., Standing Order Regarding Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project, In re: 
Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Program in the Northern District of Illinois, 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/MIDPP%20IllinoisNorthernStandingOrder.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KLE-5LAE].  
93. See Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules Agenda Book, supra note 87, at 77. 
94. See generally Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project: Overview, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/321837/mandatory-initial-discovery-pilot-project-overview (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CW9F-GSBR]. 
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C. State by State Implementation 
While many think of initial disclosures as a federal discovery tool, 
there is significant use of initial disclosures at the state level as well. 
Comprehensive initial disclosures have existed for decades in Arizona,95 
Colorado,96 Alaska,97 and Nevada,98 but they have also been adopted 
more recently in a number of other jurisdictions, including Iowa,99 
Minnesota,100 New Hampshire,101 Oklahoma,102 Utah,103 and 
Wyoming.104 In addition to the states where they have been adopted more 
comprehensively, initial disclosures have also been adopted in more 
limited ways: by case type,105 based on amount in controversy,106 or in the 
commercial courts.107 
Looking more closely at the state rules, there is a split between those 
that generally follow the current approach set out in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (including disclosure of documents and information the 
party “may use to support its claims or defenses”108) and those that have 
implemented broader initial disclosures similar to the language in the 
1993 amendments (providing for disclosure where “relevant to disputed 
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings”109). Of the ten states with 
comprehensive initial disclosure schemes, six states follow the current 
95. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1. 
96. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
97. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26. 
98. NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.1. 
99. IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.500(1).
100.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01(a). 
101.  N.H. R. CIV. P. 22. 
102.  OKLA. STAT. 12, §12-3226(2) (2014). 
103.  UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a). 
104.  WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). 
105.  KY. R. CIV. P. 93.04.  
106.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222 (applicable to cases not exceeding $50,000).  
107.  See, e.g., Delaware Complex Commercial Litigation Division (CCLD), 
https://courts.delaware.gov/superior/complex.aspx [https://perma.cc/V575-9KB4].; Handbook, 
Indiana Commercial Court Discovery Guidelines, at 22 (last modified June 10, 2016), 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/files/comm-ct-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HJZ-PJPB]. 
108.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
109.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (1993) (emphasis added). 
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federal approach, including Iowa,110 Minnesota,111 New Hampshire,112 
Oklahoma,113 Utah,114 and Wyoming.115 Four states have broader 
language similar to the 1993 amendments, requiring disclosure of that 
which is relevant (Alaska,116 Arizona,117 Colorado,118 and Nevada119). 
The MIDP in particular looked to the experiences and empirical 
research from the states to support the development of the pilot project. 
As part of its ACTL Task Force recommendations, IAALS did an 
 110.  IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.500(1) (“[A] party must . . . provide to other parties: . . . All documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, 
custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for 
impeachment.”). 
 111.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01(a) (“[A] party must . . . provide to other parties: . . . all documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, 
custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for 
impeachment.”). 
 112.  N.H. R. CIV. P. 22 (“[A] party must . . . provide to other parties: . . . all documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in his or her 
possession, custody or control and may use to support his or her claims or defenses, unless the use 
would be solely for impeachment.”). 
 113.  OKLA. STAT. 12, §12-3226(2) (2014) (“[A] party . . . shall provide to other parties a 
computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making available for 
inspection and copying the documents or other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from 
disclosure, on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent 
of injuries suffered.”). 
 114.  UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a)(a)(1) (“[A] party shall . . . serve on the other parties: a copy of all 
documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in the possession 
or control of the party that the party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and 
demonstrative exhibits that have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed in accordance with 
paragraph (a)(5).”). 
 115.  WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) (“[A] a party must . . . provide to the other parties . . . all 
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its 
possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be 
solely for impeachment.”). 
 116.  ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(D) (“[A]party shall . . . provide to other parties: a copy of, or 
a description by category and location of, all documents, electronically stored information, data 
compilations, and tangible things that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the 
pleadings.”). 
 117.  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a)(9) (“[E]ach party must disclose . . . the existence, location, 
custodian, and general description of any tangible evidence, documents, or electronically stored 
information that may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.”). 
 118.  COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (“[A] party shall . . . provide to other parties the following 
information . . . all documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or 
control of the party that are relevant to the claims and defenses of any party,” noting under Rule 
26(a)(1) that the information must be disclosed “whether or not supportive of the disclosing party’s 
claims or defenses.”). 
 119.  NEV. R. CIV. P. 16.1(a)(1)(C) (“[A] party must . . . provide to other parties: . . . all 
documents, data compilations, and tangible things that are in the possession, custody or control of the 
party and which are discoverable under Rule 26(b).”); see also NEV. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (defining the 
scope of discovery as “any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in 
the pending action.”). 
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empirical study of civil litigation in Arizona state court, including an 
evaluation of Arizona’s broad initial disclosure regime.120 As noted 
above, in Arizona’s superior court, the parties are required to make full, 
mutual, and simultaneous disclosures at the beginning of the case, with an 
ongoing duty to supplement as new information is obtained.121 The survey 
of Arizona’s bench and bar found that those attorneys and judges with 
federal and state experience preferred Arizona’s state-court extensive 
disclosures requirements—including the timing, content, and scope—at a 
higher rate than the current federal rule.122 Survey respondents reported 
that the broader disclosure scheme revealed pertinent facts early in the 
case and facilitated agreement on the scope and timing of discovery.123 
The respondents were split on whether disclosures reduce discovery 
volume and discovery time.124 Addressing some of the concerns that are 
raised regarding disclosures, the respondents did not believe that the 
disclosures require too much early investment, result in satellite litigation, 
or increase the cost of litigation.125 
The survey reflects a continuing challenge of adherence to the rule, 
with only one-third responding that litigants “often” or “almost always” 
adhere to the initial time limit for disclosures.126 Just under half reported 
that litigants “often” or “almost always” adhere to the content and scope 
of required disclosures.127 The respondents also highlighted that judges do 
not enforce the rules effectively or consistently.128 Thus, even at the state 
level where judges and lawyers prefer the broad disclosures, IAALS’ 
2010 study noted issues with adherence and enforcement. 
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) recently evaluated 
Utah’s 2011 discovery rule amendments, which included the adoption of 
initial disclosures.129 As part of its state-wide rule amendments, Utah 
implemented a three-tiered approach to discovery: (1) actions claiming 
 120.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMER. LEGAL SYS., SURVEY OF THE ARIZONA 
BENCH AND BAR ON THE ARIZONA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2010) [hereinafter INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMER. LEGAL SYS., ARIZONA SURVEY]. 
121.  ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.1(a). 
 122.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., ARIZONA SURVEY, supra note 
120, at 21. 
123.  Id. at 19. 
124.  Id.  
125.  Id. at 19-20. 
126.  Id. at 23. 
127.  Id.  
128.  Id. at 23-26. 
129.  Paula Hannaford-Agor & Cynthia G. Lee, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., UTAH: IMPACT OF THE 
REVISIONS TO RULE 26 ON DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURTS, FINAL REPORT 
(2015) [hereinafter Hannaford-Agor & Lee, UTAH]. 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss3/7
2017] THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF DISCOVERY 805 
$50,000 or less are limited to 3 deposition hours, 0 interrogatories, 5 
requests for production, 5 requests for admission, and 120 days to 
complete discovery; (2) actions claiming more than $50,000 and less than 
$300,000 or non-monetary relief are limited to 15 deposition hours, 10 
interrogatories, 10 requests for production, 10 requests for admission, and 
180 days to complete discovery; and (3) actions claiming more than 
$300,000 are limited to 30 deposition hours, 20 interrogatories, 20 
requests for production, 20 requests for admission, and 210 days to 
complete discovery.130 
One of the important takeaways from the study related to initial 
disclosures was the conclusion that “the Rule 26 revisions, particularly the 
expanded automatic disclosure requirements, are providing litigants with 
sufficient information about the evidence to engage in more productive 
settlement negotiations.”131 In terms of compliance, attorneys 
representing plaintiffs were significantly less likely to report that 
opposing counsel complied with the automatic disclosure requirements, 
and this difference was particularly notable for Tier 1 cases. “This may be 
related to the large proportion of self-represented defendants in Tier 1 debt 
collection cases who may not have been fully aware of or understood the 
automatic disclosure requirements.”132 “On the other hand, plaintiff 
attorneys were significantly more likely than defendant attorneys to report 
that discovery was completed more quickly and that the costs of discovery 
were lower due to the Rule 26 restrictions.”133 In comparison, 50.6% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the opposing party complied 
with the automatic disclosure provisions in Tier 3.134 
D. State Experimentation and Recommendations for Reform 
Initial disclosures are not the norm, even in state courts, and like the 
federal courts, there are states where experimentation has occurred in 
terms of pilot projects and case-specific initial disclosures. 
The Massachusetts Business Litigation Session (BLS) instituted a 
pilot project in December 2009 to address the increasing burden and cost 
of civil pretrial discovery, particularly electronic discovery. The project 
was influenced by the recommendations of IAALS and the ACTL Task 
Force and included the guiding principle of “limited discovery 
130.  UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(c)(3). 
131.  Id. at iv.  
132.  Id. at 36-38 
133.  Id. at 38. 
134.  Id.  
23
Kauffman: The Past, Present, and Future of Discovery
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
806 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:783 
proportionally tied to the magnitude of the claims actually at issue.”135 
The pilot project included initial disclosures of “all reasonably available 
non-privileged, non-work product documents and things that may be used 
to support that party’s claims, counterclaims or defenses,” with the timing 
to be set by the court and an ongoing duty to supplement.136 The 
evaluation of the pilot project in 2012 was very positive, with most survey 
respondents concluding that the pilot was “much better” or “somewhat 
better” than other BLS cases in terms of timeliness and cost-effectiveness 
of discovery, the timeliness of case events, and the cost-effectiveness of 
case resolution.137 A full 80% of respondents found the BLS pilot 
“provided a much better or somewhat better overall experience than a non-
BLS session.”138 
Utah has taken initial disclosures one step further and incorporated 
case-specific disclosures into its rules of civil procedure. Rule 26.1 
includes disclosures in domestic relations actions, Rule 26.2 includes 
disclosures for personal injury actions, and Rule 26.3 includes disclosures 
for unlawful detainer actions.139 Like the Employment Protocols and the 
FLSA Protocols, the Utah rules include specific disclosures relevant to 
the specific case types. The Utah rules provide that the additional 
documents and information must be provided in addition to, rather than 
as a substitute for, the parties’ Rule 26(a) disclosures.140 
While this experimentation and innovation is critical, uniformity is 
still an important goal, both at the state and federal level.141 As Professor 
Glenn Koppel pointed out in 2005, states have an opportunity to come 
together and “leverage their new assertiveness into an authentic and 
sustainable leadership role in civil procedure reform that is responsive to 
the needs of state courts.”142 Ten years later, this is exactly what the 
Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) has done by establishing a committee 
to develop recommendations for civil justice reform on a national level. 
Based on the experiences and empirical research from the state 
courts, the recent recommendations for transforming the civil justice 
 135.  Introduction to BLS Pilot Project 1 (2009), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/press/
superior-bls-pilot-project.pdf [https://perma.cc/E97U-3B2S]. 
136.  Id. at 2. 
 137.  See SUFFOLK SUPERIOR COURT BUSINESS LITIGATION SESSION PILOT PROJECT, FINAL 
REPORT ON THE 2012 ATTORNEY SURVEY 2 (Dec. 2012). 
138.  Id. 
139.  UTAH R. CIV. P. 26.1, 26.2, & 26.3. 
140.  See, e.g., UTAH R. CIV. P. 26.2.  
141.  See generally, Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: 
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Though a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2005). 
142.  Id.  
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system in state courts from the CCJ and Conference of State Court 
Administrators (COSCA) support the implementation of initial 
disclosures. CCJ created the Civil Justice Improvements Committee in 
2013 and charged it with looking at the experiences and research from the 
state courts to develop a set of recommendations to transform the state 
courts to meet the challenges—and opportunities—of the 21st Century. 
The Committee’s final recommendations, which were endorsed by CCJ 
and COSCA in July 2016, embrace the role of initial disclosures in 
streamlining the discovery process.143 Similar to Utah, the report 
recommends a pathway approach to ensure rightsized case management 
and a process proportional to the needs of the case.144 “Mandatory 
disclosures provide an important opportunity in streamlined cases to focus 
the parties and discovery early in the case. With robust, meaningful initial 
disclosures, the parties can then decide what additional discovery, if any, 
is necessary.”145 The recommendations include mandatory initial 
disclosures for the general and complex pathways as well, recognizing 
that proportional discovery, initial disclosures, and tailored additional 
discovery are essential for keeping the cases on track.146 
As Chief Justice Thomas Balmer of Oregon, the Chair of the 
Committee, has noted: 
This is a call to action for state court leaders across the country. Our 
courts need to resolve disputes fairly—but also at lower cost and with 
less delay. The support of the Conference of Chief Justices is vital, and 
now we turn to working with judicial leaders to implement these proven 
recommendations.147 
States around the country are launching into their own civil justice reform 
initiatives as a result of the recommendations and call to action. The result 
will likely be a significant incorporation of initial disclosures into the 
discovery scheme at the state level. 
IV. THE FUTURE
There is a general consensus in our civil justice system that cost and 
delay are limiting access to the courts and that discovery is one of the 
143.  CALL TO ACTION, supra note 59, at 22.  
144.  Id. at 19. 
145.  Id. at 22. 
146.  Id. at 27. 
147.  Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. St. Cts., Conference of Chief Justices Endorses Report on Civil 
Justice Improvements (Aug. 3, 2016).  
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primary causes of this cost and delay.148 There is also a consensus that the 
current federal initial disclosure scheme is not living up to its intended 
goals. Based on several recent national studies, attorneys nationwide 
generally do not believe that the current Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures 
reduce discovery,149 nor do they believe this requirement saves their 
clients money.150 High percentages also report that additional discovery 
is required after initial disclosures.151 As one commentator has argued, 
because the current Rule 26(a)(1) can be satisfied with a statement 
describing discoverable documents by category and location, without 
actual production, the current disclosure scheme serves “as an entrée into 
an expensive discovery process” rather than a means of early exchange of 
information followed by focused discovery.152 
This contrasts with the results of the Arizona experience, referenced 
above, where there was a consensus that the initial disclosure scheme 
reveals pertinent facts early in the case and does not increase satellite 
litigation. It also contrasts with the experimentation that is happening 
around the country, such as case-specific disclosures, where there have 
been very positive outcomes. This research confirms that there is still an 
opportunity for reform, particularly for broadening the scope and adoption 
of initial disclosures. 
A. The Changing Legal Landscape 
The concept of initial disclosures was first introduced to address the 
concerns of excessive adversarial-ness in our system, with the goal of 
focusing the parties and the system on finding the truth and resolving the 
disputes that come before the court in a more efficient way. These 
concerns remain equally valid—and likely even more so—in our current 
landscape. In fact, the current landscape of civil litigation, particularly in 
 148.  Corina Gerety, EXCESS AND ACCESS: CONSENSUS ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE 
LANDSCAPE 8 (2011). 
 149.  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: 
FULL REPORT 56 (2009) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA LITIGATION SURVEY]; Rebecca M. 
Hamburg & Matthew C. Koski, NAT’L EMP’T LAWYERS ASS’N, SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF FED. JUD. 
CTR. SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS, FALL 2009, 29 (2010) [hereinafter Hamburg & Koski, NELA 
SURVEY]; Kirsten Barrett et al., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, ACTL CIVIL LITIGATION 
SURVEY: FINAL REPORT 38 (2008) [hereinafter Barrett et al., ACTL FELLOWS SURVEY]. 
 150.  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA LITIGATION SURVEY, supra note 149, at 57; Hamburg & Koski, 
NELA SURVEY, supra note 149, at 29; Barrett et al., ACTL FELLOWS SURVEY, supra note 149, at 38. 
 151.  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA LITIGATION SURVEY, supra note 149, at 59; Hamburg & Koski, 
NELA SURVEY, supra note 149, at 29. 
 152.  Emily C. Gainor, Initial Disclosures and Discovery Reform in the Wake of Plausible 
Pleading Standards, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2011). 
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the state courts, suggests that a new model is essential for ensuring a 
system that is affordable and accessible to the user. 
In 2015, the NCSC, in support of the work of the CCJ Civil Justice 
Improvements Committee, undertook a study of ten jurisdictions—and 
approximately one million cases—to determine the current landscape of 
litigation in the state courts.153 The last time such a comprehensive study 
of civil caseloads was done was the 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State 
Courts.154 This study reflects the landscape of the state courts when the 
1993 federal amendments went into effect. In that study, attorneys 
represented both plaintiff and defendants in 95% of cases.155 This level of 
representation existed across case types.156 
In contrast, while representation of plaintiffs today remains at similar 
levels (92%), representation of defendants is just 26%.157 In our state 
courts today, there is an attorney on both sides of the “v” in only 24% of 
cases.158 That means 76% of the time the case does not reflect the attorney 
v. attorney model that most have in mind. At the same time, there are
much fewer cases engaging in the pretrial process. While the federal 
courts have not seen this same dramatic rise in self-represented litigants, 
their absolute number is growing in federal courts as well.159 In 1992, 14% 
of cases in state courts ended in a default judgment and 11% in 
dismissal.160 Today, those numbers have jumped to 35% dismissals, 20% 
default judgment, and 26% of unspecified judgments, which are likely 
predominantly default judgments.161 At a total of 81% of cases, this 
represents a dramatic shift toward a state court system where the vast 
majority of cases are engaging in little or no process in our courts. 
In thinking about discovery—and in particular about disclosure—we 
need to design a scheme that will address the current landscape and 
challenges in our courts, with the ultimate goal of ensuring an accessible 
and efficient way to deliver justice to the user. The changing landscape 
 153.  Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves, & Shelley Spacek Miller, NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., THE 
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (2015) [hereinafter, Hannaford-Agor et al., 
LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION]. 
154.  Id. at 6. 
155.  Id. at 31. 
156.  Id.  
157.  Id.  
158.  Id.  
159.  See Emery G. Lee III, Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice and the Cost of Legal 
Services, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 499, 505 (2015) (noting that while the percentage has remained 
relatively steady, the absolute number of non-prisoner pro se filings increased by 65% between 1999 
and 2013). 
160.  Hannaford-Agor et al., LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 153, at 7. 
161.  Id. at 20-21. 
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weighs in favor of early, broad disclosure now more than ever. For 
example, in New Hampshire’s recent pilot project experience, New 
Hampshire implemented rules that included fact-based pleadings and 
initial disclosures.162 The result was a dramatic decrease in the proportion 
of cases that were disposed of by default: “the fact pleading and automatic 
disclosure provisions provided defendants in the [pilot] cases with 
sufficient information on which to contest claims alleged by the plaintiff 
and possibly obtain a fairer resolution to the case.”163 Initial disclosures 
have the potential for great impact given the current landscape. For 
example, early disclosure of underlying information and documents in 
debt collection cases could decrease the high default rate in those cases by 
providing information on which claims can be evaluated, contested, and 
perhaps settled or tried. 
The changing landscape also poses new challenges for the 
integration of effective disclosures. For example, the growing number of 
self-represented litigants means that a clear and streamlined process of 
initial disclosures—particularly in smaller dollar value cases where self-
represented litigants (SRLs) are most prevalent—is essential. The 
evaluation of Utah’s experience addressed this concern and found “no 
evidence that self-represented litigants tended to have difficulty 
complying with the Rule 26 requirements.”164 Relatedly, one positive 
effect of the discovery reforms was a significant increase in attorney 
representation in these cases, given that attorneys are now able to 
represent parties in a proportional way.165 
Another important consideration for future reforms is the impact of 
electronically stored information (ESI) on disclosures. While ESI existed 
in 1993, the volume of ESI—and its corresponding impact on the 
traditional discovery process—has ballooned. While disputes over the 
discovery of ESI were largely confined to large corporations and large 
cases in the late 1990s and 2000s, today, discovery of ESI touches every 
case. In 2006, Rule 26(a)(1)(B) was revised to insert the phrase 
“electronically stored information” into the list of documents and tangible 
things to be disclosed.166 The concept of early disclosure of ESI causes 
concern for many lawyers who question whether such disclosure is 
 162.  Paula Hannaford-Agor et al., NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., NEW HAMPSHIRE: IMPACT OF THE 
PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY/AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURE (PAD) PILOT RULES (2013).  
163.  Id. at 18.  
164.  Id. at v. 
165.  Hannaford-Agor & Lee, UTAH, supra note 129, at 53-54. 
166.  See generally Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. U. L. REV. 171, 196 (Spring 2006). 
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efficient or even possible. While the state experiences reflect that ESI 
disclosure is possible, this remains a challenge that needs to be addressed 
head on. The federal pilot project recognizes this challenge and includes 
specific language in the Standing Orders that directly addresses the 
disclosure of ESI.167 
B. The State Courts as Laboratories for Innovation 
In deviating from the federal model, state judicial systems have 
experimented with a smorgasbord of initiatives aimed at controlling 
excessive discovery and discovery abuse. In so doing, the states are 
functioning as “laboratories for experimentation with promising 
mechanisms” for reducing cost and delay in discovery.168 
A recent and prominent example of this is the adoption of 
proportionality in the scope of discovery at the state level, to be evaluated 
and then adopted at the federal level. When the recent 2015 rule 
amendments were adopted, the Advisory Committee looked to the 
experiences of the state courts when considering whether to add 
proportionality into the scope of discovery, including the experiences in 
Utah, Colorado, and Minnesota.169 
As noted above, there are multiple states that have adopted initial 
disclosures, including Arizona and Colorado where there is a long history 
of broad initial disclosure of both the favorable and unfavorable. Given 
the positive experiences in state courts around the country, the recent state 
recommendations in support of initial disclosures, and the wave of civil 
justice reform that is sweeping the state courts, it is likely that we will see 
an increase in the use of initial disclosures at the state level over the next 
five years. This will provide an important opportunity for evaluation. In 
addition, it is likely that the states will experiment with different 
approaches, including case-specific disclosures in debt collection cases, 
for example.170 
 167.  See, e.g., Standing Order Regarding Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project, In re: 
Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Program in the Northern District of Illinois at 5-6, 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/MIDPP%20IllinoisNorthernStandingOrder.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KLE-5LAE]. 
 168.  Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform 
Code of State Civil Procedure Though a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 
1174 (2005). 
169.  See, e.g., Hannaford-Agor & Lee, UTAH, supra note 129.  
170.  CALL TO ACTION, supra note 59, at App. I. 
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C. The Need for Experience and Empirical Data 
Importantly, as the “laboratories for experimentation,” the states also 
provide the opportunity for empirical studies of discovery reform. States 
should be encouraged not only to implement initial disclosures, but to 
conduct evaluations so that other states and the federal system can learn 
from the state experiences. 
The case-specific disclosures and the federal pilot projects likewise 
provide important opportunities for evaluations. The federal MIDP 
project will be evaluated by the FJC. Successes at this level will provide 
the support and proof of concept needed for broader support and ultimate 
adoption. One of the primary arguments against reforms, including the 
2015 federal amendments, has been that more empirical data is necessary 
in order to fully evaluate proposed changes prior to nationwide adoption. 
This is where pilot projects become so important. As Judge Campbell has 
described them: 
The interest in pilot projects was stimulated by the experience in 
attempting to translate the lessons offered at the 2010 Conference into 
specific rules proposals. There are limits to what can be accomplished 
by rules. If a page in history is worth a volume of logic, the purpose of 
the pilot projects may be to create pages of history by actual experience 
in testing new approaches. One result may be rules amendments. But 
pilot projects may provide valuable lessons that are implemented in 
other ways. The Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management may find valuable practices that it can foster through its 
work. The Judicial Conference may gain similar benefits. It may be that 
approaches that have been tested and found valuable will be adopted by 
emulation without the need for formal action by any committee.171 
D. The Important Role of Culture Change 
Legal culture—“defined broadly as the shared norms and values that 
define the behavior of judges and lawyers, beyond the more formal rules 
and structure of our legal system”—plays an essential role in the 
administration of justice in our country.172 The 1993 and 2000 amendment 
processes highlight the importance that legal culture plays in the success 
and failure of civil justice reforms. The 1993 amendment process in 
171.  Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules Agenda Book 73 (Apr. 14-15, 2016). 
 172.  Brittany K.T. Kauffman, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CHANGE 
THE CULTURE, CHANGE THE SYSTEM 2 (2015) [hereinafter Kauffman, CHANGE THE CULTURE]. See 
also Kourlis & Kauffman, supra note 7.  
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particular highlighted the challenges of changing the culture through rule 
amendments alone.173 
Professor Jordan Singer has likewise highlighted the importance of 
legal culture in addressing “the problem of disproportionate discovery.”174 
He argues: 
[D]isproportionate discovery is caused not by abuse of attorney 
discretion, but by a breakdown of the core values and cultural norms that 
typically animate civil litigation in the United States. Faith in core values 
such as access to justice, adjudication on the merits, efficiency, and 
predictability ordinarily motivates lawyers to tailor the scope and 
volume of their discovery requests appropriately without judicial 
intervention. It is when these values are not strongly held that two forms 
of disproportionate discovery [excessive and abusive] emerge.175 
This brings us full circle to the very reason why initial disclosures 
were proposed in the first place. The goal of initial disclosures is to 
achieve an efficient and proportional process by disclosing information 
early in the life of the case so that the remaining discovery and pretrial 
process can be focused on the issues and streamlined to the extent 
possible. It puts the core values of access to justice, adjudication on the 
merits, efficiency, and predictability at the forefront. This is particularly 
true for broad mandatory disclosures that include both favorable and 
unfavorable evidence, where disclosures get everything out on the table 
early so that the focus can be on the merits rather than who can “win at 
discovery.”176 
Lawyers tend to elevate winning over achieving a just outcome, 
particularly when it comes to discovery. This is supported by the survey 
data from prior to the 2015 federal rule amendments, which found that a 
notable portion of attorneys responded that discovery abuse touches 
almost every case.177 A study of general counsel confirmed that a majority 
 173.  Jeffrey S. Sutton & Derek A. Webb, Bold and Persistent Reform: The 2015 Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 2017 Pilot Projects, 101 JUDICATURE 16 (Autumn 
2017). When discussing the 1993 amendments, Judge Jeffrey Sutton, chair of the Standing Comm. 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure when the 2015 rule amendments went into effect, has noted that 
they “suffered from an excess of ambition.” Id.  
 174.  See Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Culture Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
145, 149 (2012). 
175.  Id.  
176.  Kauffman, CHANGE THE CULTURE, supra note 172, at 8. 
 177.  AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA LITIGATION SURVEY, supra note 149, at 62 (51% agreed); Hamburg 
& Koski, NELA SURVEY, supra note 149, at 30 (65% agreed); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, FED. JUD. CTR., FED. JUD. CTR; NAT’L, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 70-71 (2009) 
(21% of plaintiff attorneys, 23% of plaintiff and defense attorneys, and 16% of defense attorneys 
agreed); Kirsten Barrett et al., ACTL FELLOWS SURVEY, supra note 149, at 45 (45% agreed). 
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agreed that opposing counsel are generally uncooperative, with a high 
level of discovery misconduct in the form of overusing discovery 
procedures.178 The surveys reflect that we have not had a “culture of 
proportionality” in our system, where the parties and the court work in 
tandem to ensure that the process remains proportional to the needs of the 
case—and to the needs of the litigants.179 The vehement reaction by some 
to the notion of initial disclosures in 1993 illustrates that for many, this 
was a very large cultural shift from the adversary system of discovery that 
they knew and espoused. 
The ACTL Task Force recognized the gravity of their proposal for 
broad mandatory initial disclosures: 
This change represents a dramatic shift in litigation practice, but 
business as usual is not working for clients and it is certainly not ideal 
for legal professionals. It is our hope that this Principle will lead to 
significant cultural change. The civil pre-trial process should not be a 
game of “hide the ball,” with the outcome decided by attrition. Rather, 
the arguments should be about the merits, with the outcome decided by 
the evidence (whether at trial or through settlement).180 
A lot has changed since 1993, and while legal culture will always be 
slow to catch up,181 the current landscape, the experimentation at the state 
level, the growing body of empirical evidence, and the use of pilot projects 
suggest that culture change is both possible and is happening. The 2015 
rule amendments have also paved the way for further reform, by making 
proportionality a focal point and highlighting the importance of 
cooperation. Rule 1 now explicitly recognizes the need for the parties to 
work across the aisle in order to keep cost and delay to a minimum in the 
best interests of their clients. In a 2009 study by the FJC, 63.8% of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and 61% of defense attorneys agreed that the parties 
in their cases “were able to reduce the cost and burden of discovery 
through cooperation.”182 
Advances in e-discovery and technology are also playing a role. 
While counsel has not historically disclosed the manner in which 
documents are preserved, collected, reviewed, and produced, this is 
 178.  INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL LITIGATION SURVEY OF 
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNSEL BELONGING TO THE ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE 
COUNSEL 22 (2010). 
179.  See generally Kourlis & Kauffman, supra note 7, at 513; Singer, supra note 174. 
180.  REPORT ON PROGRESS AND PROMISE, supra note 70, at 21. 
181.  Kauffman, CHANGE THE CULTURE, supra note 172, at 4. 
182.  Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Case-Based Civil Rules Survey: Preliminary 
Report to the Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 30-31 & fig. 17 (2009). 
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changing as a result of the growing use of technology-assisted review.183 
More and more courts are looking to the mandate of Rule 1, The Sedona 
Conference Cooperation Proclamation,184 and the goals behind the 
Federal Rules to support cooperation and disclosure rather than 
gamesmanship.185 While the disclosure of discovery process is different 
than the disclosure of evidence, an increased comfort in the legal culture 
with disclosure has the possibility of changing the dynamic and the culture 
of disclosure more broadly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What does this mean for initial disclosure reform? Is the system—
and the profession—now ready for a broad disclosure rule, as 
foreshadowed by Judge Niemeyer? How about the users—are they in need 
of such a process, focused on the merits and the delivery of justice? My 
response to this last question is absolutely. But, like steering a large ship, 
such dramatic changes to our civil justice system take time, and past 
experience suggests that the steps to achieve change must be deliberate 
and incremental. The 2015 rule amendments are still fresh, and it is 
important to give them the time and space to be successful in their own 
right. In addition, given the failed history of the 1993 amendments, a 
second attempt must be launched with broader support. Thus, the time is 
right for “intermediary steps” toward greater reform. In fact, this is exactly 
where we stand in terms of initial disclosure reform. The pilot projects 
and case-specific pattern discovery efforts are important steps in changing 
the culture and providing experience and empirical data to support broader 
disclosures. 
Looking to the future, over the next five to ten years, more and more 
states will adopt initial disclosures. These will take a variety of forms. 
Some states will adopt initial disclosures on a statewide basis. Others will 
implement case-type specific disclosures, enumerating exactly what 
needs to be disclosed for particular high-volume case types. This is 
particularly likely in the area of debt collection, where significant impacts 
can be achieved for the users in a large number of cases. At the federal 
level, the new FLSA discovery protocols reflect a similar opportunity to 
make a significant impact for a large number of cases. The new federal 
 183.  See Karl Schieneman & Thomas C. Gricks III, The Implications of Rule 26(g) on the Use 
of Technology-Assisted Review, 7 FED. CTS L. REV. 240, 254-55 (2013). 
 184.  The Sedona Conference, Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009 
Supp.). 
185.  See Schieneman & Gricks, supra note 183, at 254-59. 
33
Kauffman: The Past, Present, and Future of Discovery
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
816 AKRON LAW REVIEW [51:783 
MIDP project provides another important opportunity for evaluation and 
culture change. The project incorporates many of the lessons learned from 
the state experiences, such as: 1) actual production, 2) notice filed with 
the court upon service, 3) supplementation, and 4) enforcement. As the 
ACTL Task Force has recognized, one takeaway from the state initial 
disclosure experience is that “enforcement is essential.”186 It is “critical 
that there be consequences related to the lack of initial disclosures or 
inadequate disclosures.”187 The federal pilot project will be informative 
on this aspect of initial disclosures as well. 
While these are intermediary steps, they are necessary precursors to 
national reform. As Judge Jeffrey Sutton, chair of the Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure when the 2015 rule amendments went 
into effect and proponent of the federal pilot project, has said about 
adopting “reforms that are both bold yet empirical, far-reaching yet 
experimental”: 
This will take time, no doubt. And it is perhaps ironic that pilot projects 
designed to improve the speed and efficiency of federal litigation may 
delay reform. But that is the fair price of combining the virtues of 
thinking big and slow, of boldly attempting to transform the self-
contained world of pretrial discovery based squarely upon empirical 
data mined from local experimentation. And it’s a fair price for 
addressing the risk aversion and change aversion of lawyers.188 
Initial disclosures have played an important role in the history of 
discovery reform in the United States, and they continue to play an 
important role today. Despite historical challenges, they are also likely to 
be the future of discovery in the United States. While the time may not be 
right to propose broadening the federal disclosure rule, the future is not 
far off. Important groundwork is being laid for such a proposal to be 
successful, and when it is, it has the potential to be transformational for 
the users of the system who deserve a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” 
system of justice. 
 186.  REPORT ON PROGRESS AND PROMISE, supra note 70, at 19. Such enforcement mechanisms 
could include a sanction for a bad faith failure to comply absent cause or excusable neglect, an order 
precluding use of such evidence at trial, or a denial of the right to object to the admissibility of the 
evidence. 
187.  Id. at 19.  
188.  Sutton & Webb, supra note 173, at 19. 
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